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Institutionalization of Social Justice and 
Constitutionalization of Socio-economic Equality  
 
 
 
Caroline Guibet Lafaye 
Philosophy, Centre Maurice Halbwachs (CNRS)1 
 
 
Liberalism, in its different forms, takes into account some positive but limited 
requirements of mutual assistance which, in a democratic society, are institutionalized 
and implemented by laws. This requirement of impartiality has been implemented by 
the increase of public functions of mutual assistance, by the development of the welfare 
State and by the social democratic alternative of liberal theory.2 However and although 
the liberal State tends towards a conciliation of the requirements of impartiality and of 
the requirements of individuality, it remains unsatisfactory. Liberal societies impose a 
limited impartiality, obtained by means of institutions which require of their members a 
specific attachment to certain rights and to certain procedures. This task is indeed easier 
to implement than the institutionalization of a more levelling system. However we 
would like to determine up to which point and in which conditions it is possible to 
establish rights to a social minimum in addition to the rights to fundamental liberties 
and to legal and political equality guaranteed to all.3 From there, it would be possible to 
constitutionalize the elimination of poverty, through a set of limited dispositions that the 
legislative and executive authorities would be legally charged to implement, through 
specific programmes. If these measures can escape from political bargaining and from 
interested calculations, a first step towards a more global socio-economic equality 
would be made. Thus we would like, in the following developments, to consider the 
conditions of a social and political system, which satisfy the requirements of 
impartiality more than liberalism does, even in its more equalitarian versions. In the 
same way, we would like to specify the means of a progressive institutionalization of 
socio-economic equality.  
 
 
 
                                                
1 48, bd Jourdan, F–75014 Paris (France). Contact : caroline.guibet-lafaye@ens.fr 
2 Even if the great inequalities of wealth and power, within theses systems, are incompatible with a basic 
concern of equity. See Rosanvallon 1995, and Fitoussi and Rosanvallon 1996. 
3 T. Nagel however suggests that the aim of a levelling system seems to be out of the reach of a 
constitutionnalization project of social rights. 
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1- Moral conditions for the institutionalization of socio-economic equality 
 
The implementation of socio-economic equality, through a legislative programme 
and through the ordinary methods of a democratic policy, as the “constitutionalization” 
of socio-economic equality, suppose an adequate division of the reasons and of the 
motives between the sphere of the individual, the sphere of the personnal and the sphere 
of the impersonal. It is necessary, on the one hand, to ensure to each one a coherent way 
of life, enabling her to pursue her personal goals while respecting the impersonal 
reasons in her public life. The institutionalization of a more levelling socio-economic 
system will be supported by the individuals, only if its institutions and its conventions 
are psychologically viable and only if these institutions produce customs, habits and 
practices. However the individual moral attitude, regarding policies aiming at more 
equality, can change, collectively, only by the development of practices, which will 
allow individuals to follow priorities and values which are not only personal but which 
will modify their perception of themselves.  
A second stage of the realization of an egalitarian ideal supposes the recognition of a 
negative responsibility of society with regard to the inequalities, in particular, 
inequalities in income, wealth, social position, health, education which society allows. 
Deciding to defend and apply only rights associated with a system of laissez-faire 
constitutes a choice made by the State. It supports a system which remunerates 
individuals, having the strongest capacity to produce – as their heirs –, at the expense of 
the individuals who have a weaker capacity to produce4. The justification of such a 
social and political choice is based on a specific account of equalitarian impartiality. It 
rests on arguments in favour or against inequalities. It is thus necessary to put forward 
criteria and measures of justice which answer the requirements of equity and which 
could reduce these inequalities, while avoiding irreducible resistance from the members 
of the community. These principles must be able to enter within a vast plurality of 
individual conceptions of good life.  
In this aim, it is advisable to establish institutions serving an egalitarian ideal of 
impartiality without requiring these institutions an excessive impartiality of individuals. 
This point of view, as P. Ricoeur underlines it, raises the question of knowing “up to 
which point the principles of justice – and singularly the second principle [of justice of 
Rawls] – can […] exert the role of a guiding idea […] in regard to justice as a social 
practice?”.5 In the same spirit, Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers defended a “democratic 
principle of legitimacy” which would integrate, without being subjected to majority 
                                                
4 Then the latter are deprivated of what they could have had in another system. The State, and 
consequently the citizens, are responsible for this result. 
5 “Jusqu’à quel point les principes de justice – et singulièrement le second [principe de justice de Rawls] 
– peuvent […] exercer le rôle d’idée directrice […] à l’égard de la justice en tant que pratique 
sociale?” (Ricoeur 1991: 188). 
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revision, the requirement that the institutions satisfy the Rawlsian difference principle 
(see Cohen and Rogers 1983: 158-161).6 Thus the institutionalization of social justice 
could, for example, follow the way of a constitutionalization of the difference principle. 
Some substantial rules of justice, concerning for example the freedom of religion, have 
already been integrated in the institutions. Legal, civic and political equality, for 
example, are guaranteed by the Constitution and escape from the influence of human 
arguments and from political interference. In the same way, many constitutions of the 
Western industrialized countries enshrine social rights, such as rights to unemployment 
insurance, right to paid-holidays and right to social security.7 Consequently, one can 
plan to integrate in the constitution, in accordance with this model, social rights 
supporting a socio-economic equality. In this perspective, a specific development of the 
Rawlsian criterion of justice is necessary. It will give a reasonably precise idea of the 
institutional reforms that this criterion, for a particular institutional system, would 
require if it were entirely defined.8  
 
2- Difficulties associated to an institutionalization of a socio-economic equality 
 
Nevertheless the constitutionalization of these objectives presents several difficulties. 
The institutionalization of social justice, indeed, depends on the economic organization 
of society and, particularly, of private and public property. It also depends on tax 
system, inheritance, gifts and transfers of money. This means that the realization of a 
levelling socio-economic constitution which would integrate, by assumption, certain 
economic and social rights, as through a politico-legal constitution encounters 
difficulties. Indeed, it is not only a question of guaranteeing to all members of the 
society some specific rights, relatively well defined, but to guarantee to all members of 
the community medical care, education, decent housing, unemployment insurance, 
family benefits, retirement pensions and even a minimum income. Our prospect is in 
fact an extension of the specific rights, guaranteed to all, beyond fundamental freedoms 
and legal and political equality, towards a social minimum, in order to eliminate 
poverty, by constitutional means that the legislative and executive authorities would be 
                                                
6 This question and more particularly, the question of the level of a social minimum, as well as the 
question of proper rate of saving over time, the question of the background institutions of taxation and 
property, are mentioned by Rawls as belonging to the moral problems of political economy (see 1971 
(ed. 2003): 234). 
7 In Canada there were a significant social movement aiming at adding to the constitution a “social charter 
which would guarantee the right to health system, social assistance and education (Kymlicka and 
Norman 1992: 1-2). This charter was defended by 85% of Canadians and 88% of Québécois. 
8 T. Pogge suggests that “Rawls’s criterion can be used to design a blueprint of ideal institutions that 
would be perfectly just. But much more important for now is its role in the comparative assessment of 
alternative feasible institutional schemes” (1989: 12). 
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legally charged to implement through specific programmes.  
 
a) Human and psychological difficulties 
The implementation of principles of equality, in a socio-economic field, involve, 
firstly, difficulties due to human nature and to human psychology. More specifically, 
these difficulties concern, personal motivation and choices, and first of all the desire to 
acquire. These personal reasons constrain the pursuit of a global equalitarian ideal, even 
if this prospect is supported by a real political design. Even within liberal societies, the 
most favoured individuals – i.e. not only the rich minority, but a majority of individuals 
who are not poor – tend to slow down the pursuit of socio-economic equality, beyond a 
relatively modest level. Whereas during the XXth century in particular, attitudes with 
regard to racial or sexual discrimination have changed, on the other hand, social 
attitudes towards economic inequality, except extreme poverty, remain the same. The 
winners of economic competition, the heirs of a fortune or of an advantageous social 
position tend to think that they have been lucky or that they deserve their advantages. In 
the majority of cases, they do not conceive that they enjoy benefits of badly acquired 
profits or that they enjoy profits whose origin sullies their reputation, in particular when 
they are inherited advantages. The recognition of the legitimacy of a redistributive 
system, of which part of the contributors seem to be the victims, supposes that the 
holders of high incomes owe their fortune in respect to historical contingencies, much 
more than to their own qualities, their own choices or to their personal efforts. The way 
in which a person earns her money, in a competing economy, where equal opportunity 
is not forced by the traditional forms of discrimination, seems seldom illegitimate from 
the winners’ point of view. It is, generally, conceived that these inequalities are justified 
in an external way. The recipients of this system imagine that they legitimately have 
natural capacities and assets, due to their education and to their social condition, and 
which they have exploited well.9  
The creation of stable egalitarian institutions, however, requires that these attitudes 
change. Thus the resistance induced by the implementation of socio-economic equality 
can be overcome, for example, if the conventional institutional structures, which work 
in favour of the common and public good in a morally acceptable way, penetrate more 
to the heart of individual life. Thus we can suppose that the more general the common 
good that the political system aims to implement is, the more the pursuit of this good – 
in particular if this good is conceived in levelling terms – will escape from the contrary 
influences of democratic politics (e.g. Nagel 1991: 95). In the same way, the priority 
given to the worst-off, in the socio-economic field, can constitute a basis for public 
                                                
9 The corresponding attitude, concerning advantages due to a dominant race or due to gender, is not any 
more acceptable nowadays. 
  - 5 - 
policy. This requirement can guide debates concerning social and economic policy. 
However these debates aim at a consensus between the partners, since “so long as there 
was sufficient agreement among the members of a society about the implications of 
social justice, these might be embodied in specific substantive rules and incorporated in 
the constitution” (Barry 1995: 96).  
 
b) Difficulties of an economic nature 
Moreover, the institutionalization of social justice supposes to solve economic 
difficulties. Economic life is narrowly dependent on incentives and economic 
stimulations. The realization of a structure, in which economic inequalities are reduced, 
must be compatible with the preservation of productivity. The legal and economic 
structures, able to implement, constitutionally, socio-economic equality must preserve 
individuality and economic efficiency. Efficiency certainly constitutes an argument 
which cannot be neglected. Nevertheless and from an ethical point of view, the pursuit 
of the greatest profitability and of the highest productivity, whatever the cost, cannot 
constitute a priority principle.  
 
c) Difficulties relating to the implementation of social justice 
The constitutionalization of social justice – which is a fundamental stage of the 
realization of socio-economic equality – must finally face difficulties related to its 
implementation. Indeed, it is not sufficient that an agreement between the social 
partners registers, in the constitution, rights ensuring social justice between all the 
members of the community. In fact, we can legitimately expect that there are various 
opinions concerning the best real social arrangement (i.e. the best calculated 
arrangement) and the arrangement the most able to privilege the worst-off. Rawls 
underlines that tax legislation and laws on property belong to the field of the “essential 
constitutional questions” and belong to the field of justice as equity. They are subject to 
a reasonable disagreement, concerning the implications of principles of justice.10  
In the same way, B. Barry suggests that social justice is not able to determine the 
                                                
10 In a theory of justice, it is the only source of authorized indetermination. Rawls stresses that “the 
question whatever legislation is just or unjust, especially in connection with economic and social 
policies, is commonly subject to reasonable differences of opinion. […] Often the best that we can say 
of a law or policy is that it is at least not clearly unjust. The application of the difference principle in a 
precise way normally requires more information that we can expect to have and, in any case, more 
than the application of the first principle” (1971: 174). There is nothing incoherent here with the 
assessment that the principles of justice must leave open a fair result, in a more radical way. The main 
difficulty consists in applying the difference principle, that is to decide which laws and which policies 
would be, actually, most advantageous, in terms of primary goods for the worst off group. 
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level or organisation of health, education or social security provision. In the modern 
societies, social justice requires that all the requirements related to these fields be 
satisfied. Nevertheless variations and modifications are possible.11 In spite of the 
mobility of labour and capital and in spite of the free exchange of goods and services, 
collective decisions can be made about laws concerning the security of employment, 
environment and social wages.  
It is true, however, that the concept of social justice cannot establish, by itself, a 
single response to the encountered difficulties. Indeed, there is no conventional element 
of agreement able to determine the distribution of income and the distribution of health 
care, for example. In the case of public services, it can be admitted that justice concerns, 
initially, the way in which funds are obtained and the way in which services are 
distributed between the potential beneficiaries. However the level of the expenditure 
depends, to a certain extent and legitimately, on what citizens agree to pay for, that is, it 
depends on the “willingness to pay”.12 Brian Barry suggests that if we do not attribute to 
the courts of justice the interpretative authority of the difference principle – or of any 
other principle of distributive justice – it seems difficult to imagine a specific formula, 
establishing a progressive taxation on incomes or an inheritance tax, that can be set in 
constitution.13 Thus and even if the difference principle would sustain a broad 
consensus, it appears that its concrete implementation will cause dissension.  
 
3- Circumstances of impartiality 
 
However, these conflicts can be avoided under several conditions. They depend, in 
particular, on the conditions of the decision-making processes and of the selection of the 
principles of justice. Indeed the procedures best able to encourage just laws and fair 
policies are those which respect the conditions of the original position described by 
Thomas Scanlon.14 This original position supposes that people are well informed, 
pursue their own interests and their own conception of the good, but are able to 
                                                
11 For example the French people can choose to privilege education instead of pensioners, whereas the 
Germans can decide to support the retirements while being less generous in regards to education. 
These divergences reflect collective preferences and distinct social choices. 
12 See B. Barry analysis concerning the expertise on the value, starting from the implementation of the 
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) founded on the “willingness to pay” (WTP) and the 
“willingness to accept” (WTA) (1995: 153 and sqq.). 
13 The courts of justice can intervene to implement principles of social justice. However, they cannot 
initiate governmental programs nor have a systematic sight on governmental policies neither. This 
practical problem is not the only one. The achievement of social justice aims implies expenditure. 
However the courts of justice have not the capacity to control the budget distribution neither to 
orientate tax allocation nor to make decisions regarding the level of expenditure, within a country or a 
State. 
14 See Guibet Lafaye 2005: ch. 3. 
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recognize and acknowledge the reasonable objections formulated by others. The 
institutional framework guarantees equality between the partners. Each one has a right 
of veto on the proposals which he cannot reasonably reject. The hypothetical conditions 
thus described draw the circumstances of justice. Thus “we may define the 
circumstances of impartiality as the conditions under which the substantive rules of 
justice of a society will tend actually to be just” (Barry 1995: 100).15 Indeed the 
circumstances of impartiality not only lead to justice but are, in themselves, intrinsically 
fair. They describe the conditions under which a principle of justice can be applied.  
Within the conditions able to produce a broad disposition that can accept the force of 
reasonable objections, we can add to these circumstances of justice the requirement to 
hold the citizens equal, in a fundamental sense. This principle allows that an objection 
can never be rejected, for the sole reason that it was formulated by a member of a 
minority (see Barry 1995: 102-103). In a situation where all the participants are well 
informed and where their interests are expressed with the same force, a good argument 
does not depend on the social identity of its defender. Equity is respected when the 
process aims and leads to a consensus. On the other hand, when this consensus is not 
possible, each partner is equally treated, if a voice in a vote is granted to her, for 
example. However this condition is not sufficient. 
It is also necessary – and this is an additional condition – to establish a policy, such 
that the arguments are weighted and in which the best argument win, rather than a 
policy where only count the votes and the majority vote. Each participant must be able, 
within this process of decision-making, to defend his own conception of the good and to 
convince the others that their conceptions, well understood, amount to the same position 
as his position. In this way we can also consider the manner in which public policies can 
be provided, in a neutral way, in comparison with the various conceptions of good life.16  
Incontestably, there are also precise rules of decision, specifying the way in which 
the election of a Parliament or a voting procedure for legislation within the Parliament 
must proceed. Governmental laws and governmental policies cannot be respected and 
have validity only if they result from a process of “open justifications openly arrived at” 
(Macedo 1991: 69).17 Legislation, for example, must be founded on a process of 
consultation, during which the individuals and the groups concerned have sufficient 
time to formulate proposals and comments, sufficient time to be heard and to take part 
                                                
15 The concept of “rules of justice” gives here an account of moral rules as well of legal rules.  
16 See Barry 1995: 143. This interpretation of a field of neutrality was advocated by R. Dworkin and 
criticized by Joseph Raz (1986: 110-162), Jeremy Waldron (1989: 61-83), and Stephen Mulhall and 
Adam Swift (1992: 29-32 in particular). Although Dworkin recognized the requirement of such a 
field, he did not demonstrate, in a precise way, how public policies could be followed while respecting 
the neutrality of procedures. The arguments used in favour of allowances indexed on the resources 
(i.e. rights, money, etc.) rather than on utility, are related to the distribution of private goods (Dworkin 
1981a and 1981b).  
17 Consequently social justice is guaranteed in the framework of such procedures. 
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into the process of rational evaluation. A law which results from this procedure is 
justifiable and can be actually defended. Thus these requirements – which are empirical 
– concern the procedure more than the substantive and positive principles of justice. 
Nevertheless, when they are respected, there is a lower likelihood of ending up with 
unjust legislation than when these requirements are not respected. The constitutional 
requirements, the institutions of education, the organization of mass media and of 
communication provide the conditions under which the decisions taken respect the 
circumstances of impartiality. Thus the possibility of guaranteeing social justice rests on 
the circumstances of impartiality. In a general way, “a just constitution must be set up in 
such a way that all decisions are taken in ways that instantiate the circumstances of 
impartiality” (Barry 1995: 110).  
However as Rawls underlines it, public reason works as a norm of impartial 
justification, whose limits concerning the decision-making process “do not apply 
[however] to all political questions but only to those involving what we called the 
‘constitutional essential’ and questions of basic justice” (Rawls 1993: 204; see also § 5). 
By contrast, much tax legislation and many laws regulating property, statues protecting 
the environment and controlling pollution, establishing national parks and preserving 
wilderness areas and animal and plant species, and laying aside funds for museums and 
arts do not belong to these fundamental matters. Thus Rawls distinguishes two kinds of 
objects. The first – tax legislation and laws on property – belong to the field of justice as 
equity but are subject to a reasonable dissension, concerning the implications of 
principles of justice. The second category of objects – i.e. the rest of the list – concerns 
questions which cannot be solved without giving priority to one conception of the good 
rather to another. The requirement of impartial justification is satisfied, in this case, 
only if the procedure, in accordance with which decisions are made, is fair and if the 
policy is fairly accomplished. Thus the taxes financing public expenditure must be 
raised according to fair methods. Indeed, against such measures – or against all other 
policies –, one cannot maintain the fact that this disposition is appropriate for those 
which defend such conception of the good, but not for those which defend another 
conception of the good. It is thus necessary to require that the procedures by which 
decisions of courts – and, more generally, decisions concerning the social context – 
respect the fairness of the decision process. When justice exists, the fairness of the 
procedure adds a value to that which the fair and impartial decision has by itself. Even 
when the decision taken would be perfectly just, it is essential that the method by which 
the decision is taken is not unjust or inequitable. Indeed, when people are not satisfied 
with a decision, they are nevertheless more able to accept it, if this decision was taken at 
the end of a fair procedure.18 When the justice of a decision is doubtful – as it is often 
                                                
18 By hypothesis we are in presence of conflicting conceptions of the good. The individuals cannot thus 
assert that the adequate criterion, within several principles of justice, is the one which manages the 
best to carry out the good. Consequently “where justice is unavailable to provide the basis of 
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the case – the equity of the procedure which conduces to it makes it more acceptable. 
Within the framework of a convenient original position, fair procedures will be allowed, 
not only because they lead to just decisions but also because the equity of the process, 
leading to these decisions, will make them more acceptable. In many cases, justice as 
impartiality can specify that the decision must be made in accordance with a fair 
procedure.  
 
 
In this way the conditions under which a political system can introduce measures 
contributing to an institutionalization of socio-economic equality are specified. Indeed 
principles of justice and political decisions, which respect the requirements of 
impartiality and thus reflect their neutrality, could satisfy the conditions of an 
integration of the just within a plurality of conceptions of the good life and also satisfy 
the citizens’ requirements for principles of social justice. These principles suppose, in 
particular, that the rules implemented in the decision-making process should not favour 
any particular conception of the good – against other conceptions – nor should they be 
defended by appealing to any other particular conception of the good.  
The realization of a greater social justice within our institutions would require a 
specification of the transition which would lead towards fairer social institutions. In this 
way we will contribute to the reform of existing social institutions so as to render them 
more just. It will, secondly, help to improve the situation of the worst-off. This 
transition will finally require us to accept certain constraints upon our conduct and 
policies.19 The implementation of a project of social justice requires a reflection about 
the existing social institutions, the roles and functions involved in these institutions, 
taken as a single system. This reflection will allow the identification of feasible 
alternative systems, by taking into account the social context in which we nowadays act. 
It seems, however, that the most plausible approach to an institutionalization of social 
justice is to proceed by a constitutionalization of the difference principle. 
                                                                                                                                          
agreement, we cannot hope to find consensus on the basis of any other substantive criterion”. On the 
other hand one can suppose that in an adapted original position, people will be concerned by the 
accuracy and the equity of the procedures of decisions-making. “Generalizing the point, we may say 
that, where substantive justice falls short, the search for agreement has to be pushed up to the 
procedural level” (Barry 1995: 109-110).  
19 This is our own responsibility in front of the existing injustices and this shall not depend on whatever 
an institutional system entirely just is feasible or not. 
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